I-Day was yesterday. Other than the environmental effects from the explosion of new whiteworks smell that is now being carried around the globe via the jet stream, the most important part of I-Day is the official release of recruit lists. As most of you already know, the Naval Academy does not participate in the National Letter of Intent program, so Navy coaches cannot discuss recruits until they are actually enrolled in the school. You can find the football release here.
The coaches don’t talk about recruits until I-Day, but thanks to various media sources we usually already have a pretty good idea of who’s coming. That makes the official release less of a cause for celebration, and more a cause for nervous apprehension as we scan the names looking to see who’s changed their mind since verbally committing. The most unusual part about this year’s class is that there are only two quarterbacks. Normally there are a bunch of them; two or three will end up staying at QB, and the rest are athletic enough to fit in at other positions. Not so this year. We already know that Kavon Seaton left NAPS. Apparently, this year’s QB crop is all headed to Newport first. I’m not panicking, I just found it a little bit strange to only see two QBs.
Anyway, as usual on I-Day, it’s also time to re-post the manifesto.
I’m home alone right now, and great googly moogly is it boring around here. My wife is out of town on some urgent family business, so my personal interaction with others has been limited to pushing my cat down every time he climbs up onto my keyboard. That’s not to say that there isn’t any excitement, though. I mean, last week I came home from work one day to discover that the cat had opened the door to the garage, and the dog had learned how to escape from his crate. The two of them proceeded to find the bag of dog food that we keep in the garage, rip it open, engorge themselves, then leave heaping piles of crap all over the carpet. VROOM VROOM DER PARTY STARTER. The thought of an encore makes me feel all tingly.
As exciting as that was, I still look for other, less odorous, ways to entertain myself. Rather than doing anything productive with my free time, my favorite pastime in this situation is watching old games. It’s like my own little ESPN Classic, but without the bowling or world’s strongest man competitions. It’s good to calibrate my memory whenever I get the chance; it’s sort of amazing how the things you think you remember can differ from what actually happened in a game. It’s fun to see players and plays I haven’t thought about in a while, too. The best part about revisiting old games is being able to look at them with a critical eye, but without the inherent emotional bias that you have when watching it live.
Emotional bias really wasn’t a problem for the first game I decided to take a look at– last season’s Georgia Tech-Georgia game. I mean, I wanted Georgia Tech to win, of course, but a loss wouldn’t have had the same marriage-jeopardizing implications for me that most Navy losses do. I know, I know… Georgia Tech again. Blah blah blah. But even if you’re sick of talking about them, there’s still plenty to learn from watching them. They’re like an offensive laboratory for us. It’s not because of what they’re doing themselves, necessarily; I don’t think they’re doing much that we haven’t seen before, although the frequency with which they do a few things is a bit different. It’s really about the opportunity to see how a different group of defenses line up and try to stop the spread option, and to see if there’s any difference in how common opponents (like Duke) try to defend the two teams. I’m kicking myself right now for not having recorded more Tech games this year, but oh well. I’ll be sure to get their games that don’t conflict with Navy’s next year.
Anyway, enough talk of poop and regret. More talk about football. As I was rewatching the game, I took notes on a couple of items that I thought would be of interest to Navy fans. I began this post with the intention of highlighting only those things, but as I got going I figured I might as well break down the whole game like I would any other. In the process of doing so, I was reminded of plays we’ve seen in Navy games past. I decided to go ahead and include that stuff too. It makes for one long, sprawling post. But hey, it just gives us more to talk about in the middle of the summer, right? So off we go.
Paul Johnson may have left the Naval Academy, but I think it’s safe to say that most of us still root for him. It’s hard not to. His offense gave Navy a singularity in the cosmos of major college football; something above and beyond the usual “they play hard for 60 minutes!” type of chatter that seems to come naturally to casual observers of the service academies. College football reporters and talking heads thst covered this ingenious combination of run & shoot and spread option couldn’t seem to decide if the offense was innovative or archaic. Navy fans didn’t care either way. To us, the offense was just something uniquely ours. Of course, with the wins, bowl games, and service academy domination, Johnson could have run pretty much anything and Navy fans would still be happy. Beyond the offense and results he produced, he was also a great interview– sarcastic, straightforward, and funny to listen to. Most of us just plain liked the guy. So as upset as we were when he moved on to what he felt were greener pastures at Georgia Tech, most of us hope he finds the kind of success in Atlanta that he didn’t think was possible in Annapolis. (Feel free to correct me if I’m wrong). Even those of you who might not be pulling for Coach Johnson still get the enjoyment of seeing skeptics of this offense have to eat their words. (Of course, we knew that would happen all along).
(As a side note, how annoying is it to watch the same “experts” who told you how the option would fail in a BCS conference now try to explain to you how and why it works? Meh, moving on…)
But now, the offense isn’t just ours anymore; our friends at Georgia Tech have joined us in the pleasure of hearing the same cliches every year about how the option won’t work. As fun as it can be having a second chance to see our favorite offense in action each Saturday, do you ever wonder if Paul Johnson being at another school somehow has an adverse effect on Navy? I mean other than the obvious questions people have whenever a new coach takes over a school; hopefully by now you don’t need any convincing as to Ken Niumatalolo’s ability to lead the Mids. But could it be possible that in rooting for Georgia Tech, you are indirectly rooting for Navy’s demise? That Georgia Tech, in using the same offense that helped catapult Navy to success, might somehow be working against the Mids now?
Now, I’m not privvy to the inner machinations of the bidding process, so I fully acknowledge that this could very well be the result of an offer that Army and Navy just couldn’t refuse. And if both sides want to continue getting competitive bids from other cities, it’s probably important to throw a bone to someone outside of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore once in a while. On the surface, though, it kind of stinks. Nobody likes Fedex Field; it’s a soulless, hard-to-access behemoth in the middle of nowhere that looks not unlike the ship that took ET back home. The Navy-Air Force games played there couldn’t get back to Annapolis fast enough.
My biggest concern, though, is the prospect of 20,000 empty seats at the game. Can Army-Navy really fill 90,000 seats? I hope so. Demand for tickets is probably enough to surpass the 65-70,000 that are available for games in Philadelphia and Baltimore, but 90,000 is a lot. People say that there’s a concentration of alumni and fans in the Washington area, so we’ll see. It didn’t make a difference for the Air Force game. Then again, nobody cares about Air Force.
With a 14-5 dismantling at the hands of Duke in the first round of the NCAA tournament, the Navy lacrosse season came to a rather unceremonious conclusion. That was one painful game to watch, wasn’t it? It was the HBO free preview weekend on DirecTV, and I could’ve changed the channel to Schindler’s List and not have been as depressed as I was watching that debacle. Already a 10-0 blowout by halftime, it was probably the most disheartening Navy performance since the loss to Air Force in 2003. My father, after sending me a text message at the half announcing that he’d switched to the NASCAR race (I can’t blame him), called me after the game saying, “Well, at least we won the second half.” Which to me kind of felt like saying, “Well, I know we’re at the vet to put the dog to sleep, but at least we got a good parking space.” He was right, of course, but at the time I wasn’t really in the mood for silver linings.
With such a lousy ending, it would be easy to forget that there were, in fact, “up” parts in this up-and-down season. Looking at the big picture, there is quite a bit to be happy about. Navy went to the NCAA tournament for the 6th consecutive year after having missed the previous four. The Mids also won their fifth Patriot League tournament in the six years that they’ve been a member of the conference. The regular season included the first win over Georgetown since 2004, an absolute manhandling of Maryland, and a convincing win over Army to erase the memory of last year’s loss. There isn’t a Navy fan out there that wouldn’t have taken these results if they were offered to him at the beginning of the season.
“Are we losing literally hundreds upon hundreds of outstanding officer candidates that will not consider going to any of the service academies because they have no chance to pursue a possibility?” Calhoun said. “I think right now we’re deterring a good chunk of young men and young women just because of a door that’s immediately shut.”
Brilliant. If you just make it easier to get out of the service commitment, then more people would be willing to go to service academies! Now THERE’S the argument we want to be making hot on the heels of Washington Post op-eds calling for service academies to be closed. But if that’s your logic, then why limit it to football players? If we just shortened the commitment for everyone, or if we let anyone defer or eliminate service obligations whenever something better comes along, then imagine how many awesome candidates we’d attract! But you never hear that argument made. Somehow, it’s ridiculous to suggest such a thing for midshipmen/cadets in general, but it’s a candidate-enhancing boon when applied to football players. It’s just too hard to believe.
It’s hard to blame a football coach for making this argument. His job is to win games, and he’s just looking for ways to to help him do his job. It is, however, easy to blame a service academy graduate. The service commitment is more than just paying back the cost of an education. It’s the very reason the schools exist. The op-ed in the Post was right; there are cheaper ways to produce new ensigns and second lieutenants. The reason why the cost of the service academies is justified is because it’s cheaper to produce admirals and generals that way; service academy graduates become career officers at a higher rate than their ROTC and OCS counterparts. Trying to lure applicants who aren’t even willing to commit to 5 years isn’t going to increase the rate of academy graduates who make it to 20. It’ll do the opposite. And if you love your school at all, you don’t want that.
Sometimes I wonder if the people making these arguments really understand what they’re saying.
With the success of the football program from 2003-2007, Navy fans might have become just a wee bit spoiled. Taking their cue from the “Expect to Win” mantra used by NAAA as their football marketing slogan, supporters of the Blue & Gold had set their sights higher and higher before the start of each new football season. Preseason optimism– that force which makes diehards look at the upcoming schedule and figure that every game is winnable– was running rampant, as was the daydreaming about “what if” scenarios should the team do the impossible by running the table. Ah, the offseason. For all the complaining that we do once it arrives, it never fails to recharge the batteries of imagination for the hopelessly partisan. The Mids were never quite able to reach those lofty dreams of going undefeated and unleashing their fury in BCS bowls, except on my Xbox. Yet they were remarkably consistent: five straight years of 8+ wins, 5 straight bowl games, and 5 straight Commander-in-Chief’s Trophies. This standard for success was the fuel-air mixture in the internal combustion engine of fan expectations.
If the program’s prosperity was the fuel for high expectations, then Paul Johnson was the piston that drove the machine. (Smartass comments from former RX-7 owners are not necessary. You know who you are.) Johnson was a master motivator, knowing just how and when to apply pressure so that his team would respond. He was a master playcaller, knowing just the right way to wield his offense for maximum effect. He was a master recruiter, reversing two decades of losing recruiting battles to Air Force. And in the end, he was a heartbreaker, leaving Annapolis for Atlanta– and taking those daydreams of some Navy fans with him.
Enter Ken Niumatalolo, Johnson’s successor. As Johnson’s right-hand man with the offense, Niumat was the no-brainer pick to replace Johnson by just about everyone who followed the program closely. He was received well by the Navy faithful; Athletic Director Chet Gladchuck earned praise from fans and from the press (and from this blogger) for acting quickly to name Niumat as head coach rather than carry out an extended coaching search. If Johnson was ever going to leave Navy– and just about everyone expected it to happen sooner or later– then Niumat was the guy we wanted to replace him. Yet despite the almost universal agreement that the right man was hired for the job, the confidence and optimism that accompanied the Johnson years wasn’t really there to start 2008. For the most part, I don’t think it was a slight to Niumatalolo as much as it was recognition for just how hard it is to win at Navy. At least that’s what I hope it was. After all, the last winning coach to leave Annapolis was George Welsh in 1982, and that started what would become the darkest period in Navy football history. It was the only experience most Navy fans had in this situation. Adding to the uncertainty was the national media’s persistent love affair with Troy Calhoun, and their almost universal expectation for Air Force to return to the top of the service academy heap.
Well, that didn’t happen. And if you had any doubts before, you can cast them aside. The job that Ken Niumatalolo and his staff did in 2008 was as impressive as anything we saw in the Johnson years.
Since we’re talking about Air Force, now would probably be a good time to talk about the recent hullabaloo over the Mountain West’s attempts to gain BCS membership, or to create a playoff. With all the talk we do around here about recruiting advantages, can you imagine if Air Force coaches could go into a recruit’s living room and tell him that he could play for a BCS conference? Especially when that recruit’s options are probably something like Air Force, Navy, Bucknell, Dartmouth, and Rhode Island. Those three little letters would certainly enhance the Mountain West’s image, Air Force included. Perception is reality, as the cliché goes. It would also add a lot of money to Air Force’s coffers. So… Is it time?
In a word, no.
The Mountain West can talk about how good Utah, TCU, and BYU are all they want, but it won’t matter. The BCS isn’t about quality of competition. The BCS is about putting together a television package that generates the maximum amount of revenue while being split between the fewest possible number of teams. To that end, it doesn’t matter how good the teams are. All that matters is how many people will watch. This is where the Mountain West’s case falls flat.
The BCS isn’t made up of the best teams in college football; any number of non-BCS teams routinely knock off BCS-conference foes every year. The BCS is made up of the most popular teams in college football. Take a look at the average home attendance of each BCS conference last year:
SEC
76,844
Big Ten
70,125
Big 12
62,956
Pac-10
57,350
ACC
52,737
Big East
43,145
Now, compare that to the Mountain West’s average attendance: 35,125. Only two MWC teams, BYU and Utah, have a higher home attendance than the Big East’s average. Those two teams skew the league’s average a bit. The average home attendance for the rest of the conference is a paltry 25,802. In short, nobody cares about the Mountain West.
That isn’t meant to be a slight to the MWC. It’s just reality. If the MWC or anyone else is serious about joining the BCS, they don’t need to show how their teams are good enough to compete; Utah, BYU, and TCU have done that. What they need to do is show how their inclusion would make current BCS members more money. But as the attendance numbers show, the Mountain West doesn’t add enough value in terms of a dedicated following for the BCS to be able to charge a significant premium for its television package. Adding nine more teams would just reduce the per-school share of the BCS money pie. That’s also why there’s resistance to a playoff; the money generated from the tournament would have to be split between too many teams. There is no incentive for the BCS schools to be more inclusive.
The people running the Mountain West aren’t stupid. I’m sure they know that they have no chance at seeing their proposals come to fruition. But by making a public to-do out of it, they generate free publicity for their best teams, highlight the true nature of the current BCS system for the public, and help to establish themselves as a leader among the non-BCS conferences.
Those are all good things as far as Mountain West schools are concerned, but nothing any Navy fan should really worry about.
At this time last year, it appeared that Air Force head football coach Troy Calhoun and AD Hans Mueh were preparing fans for the worst. At the very least, they probably wanted to temper the expectations of those who dreamed of a future filled with Mountain West greatness after Calhoun went 9-4 in his first season in Colorado Springs. The recurring theme to their responses when asked about how the 2008 season would go was how young the Air Force football team would be. There was talk of “thin senior classes” and how it would be three years before Calhoun has the team full of the juniors and seniors he needs to really succeed. With talk like that, it would have been easy to expect disaster, but disaster isn’t what happened. Not exactly, anyway.
Which is scarier? Jason Voorhees repeatedly rising to terrorize counselors at Camp Crystal Lake with a machete despite being vanquished at the end of each Friday the 13th movie? Or the fact that someone thought it was a good idea to make another Friday the 13th movie?
The same question could be asked of Army’s Alternative “Service” Option– the villain in the slasher-flick world of service academy football. Just when you thought the topic was dead, it comes out of nowhere to hack internet conversation to bits and haunt your dreams. (OK, that last part is a Nightmare on Elm Street reference, but they made Freddy vs. Jason, so the judges have allowed it.) At a West Point Board of Visitors meeting a couple weeks ago, the question of the ASO came up. On Tuesday, Sal Interdonato wrote about the responses given by the superintendent, LTG Franklin Hagenbeck, athletic director Kevin Anderson, and new head football coach Rich Ellerson, here. And whoa Nelly there’s some classic buck-passing going on in this one.
BUT FIRE WILL ONLY MAKE IT ANGRIER!
The Supe has some hum-dingers. Highlights:
Hagenbeck: “In ’05, we wrote a particular standard in line with OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense). We moved out and had some youngsters go to the professional ranks other than football. Last year, Caleb Campbell was drafted by the Detroit Lions. The spotlight was on him. Another service academy was very outspoken and their view was we had an unfair competitive advantage and had that policy turned around in a blink of an eye…We are all under the same policy and how you look at it and implement it is the question.”
It’s bad enough that Hagenbeck completely dodges any responsibility that he might have had in this debacle, but he didn’t stop there. No, he takes it a step further and decides to blame the Naval Academy. With that, I would like to cordially invite LTG Hagenbeck to screw himself. (All the Army fans that will inevitably read this and feign offense because I told an OMG GENERAL to screw himself can likewise screw themselves). He gets away with it because there’s nothing that some Army fans like more than blaming Navy for their problems. I don’t know where that trend began, but it’s as pathetic as it is absurd. “Evil Navy is a bunch of wimps that don’t fight the real war, so they tell Army recruits’ parents that their kid will die! Evil Navy went to the NCAA about Army player eligibility!” Etc., etc. Maybe it makes some Army fans feel better to think that way, but the result of believing this nonsense is that they fail to hold accountable the people truly responsible for their problems. People like LTG Hagenbeck, who can’t even get his story straight while he tries to play the victim:
Another service academy was very outspoken and their view was we had an unfair competitive advantage and had that policy turned around in a blink of an eye…
They (cadets) could buy out. It was $280,000 and spend their remaining time in the reserves subject to recall. If you didn’t show progress in the pro ranks, Army could recall you back. That was all laid out. OSD came back literally at the 11th hour, actually less than 48 hours when Caleb reported to Detroit to say that definition of active duty for the first two years was not acceptable.
Which is it, General? Did mean ol’ Navy get that policy turned around in the “blink of an eye,” or did it drag on so that you heard nothing until the “11th hour?” You can’t have it both ways. And his claim that he received nothing in writing is suspect. Do we need to go over the ASO timeline again?
2005: Army creates the ASO.
August 2007: After representatives from each of the academies voiced their concerns over differing policies between the services, a memo is promulgated from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) regarding the “Policy for Academy and ROTC Graduates Seeking to Participate in Professional Sports Before Completion of their Active Duty Service Obligations.” The policy orders two years of active duty before a service academy or ROTC graduate is able to apply for excess leave to attempt to catch on with a team. The policy becomes effective Jan. 1, 2008.
April 2008: Caleb Campbell is drafted.
Only three freaking days after the draft: Dr. David Chu, the Under Secretary in question– who has absolutely nothing to do with the Navy or the Naval Academy, by the way– sends out a new memo, “retransmitting” the August 2007 policy and stating that it is “a policy that remains in force and may not be supplemented.” In order to address any claim that playing in the NFL could itself be considered “active duty,” the memo goes on to add that “constructs for ‘active duty’ service should not include arrangements typically unavailable to others in uniform.” This all happened three months, not 48 hours, before Lions training camp.
May 2008: After this new memo is sent, Army begins their “internal review.”
July 2008: Caleb Campbell is pulled away from Lions training camp.
We can deduce from Hagenbeck’s comments that our initial suspicion about the nature of that “internal review” was pretty much dead on. It wasn’t an “internal review” as much as it was weeks of begging and weaseling between Army officials and the OSD, with the former trying to manipulate the ASO into legitimacy. If anything happened at the “11th hour,” it was someone at OSD saying “no means no” for the thirtieth time. LTG Hagenbeck had been told “no” a whole hell of a lot sooner than “less than 48 hours” before Campbell reported to Lions camp. Chu’s “retransmit” memo proves it. For Hagenbeck to say otherwise is nothing but dishonest revisionism.
Did Naval Academy officials complain about the ASO after Campbell was drafted? Of course they did, and they should have. But Dr. Chu obviously didn’t need to hear anything from Navy to smack the ASO down; his reaction was immediate. The facts are simple; the OSD had a policy in place. West Point tried to violate that policy. The OSD didn’t let them. And by fighting the decision until the last minute, Army jerked Campbell around and created a public relations train wreck for themselves. Hagenbeck’s lack of accountability is disappointing. Trying to blame the Naval Academy is just shameful.
(By the way, can you imagine if a cadet went to a conduct board and said something like, “We are all under the same policy and how you look at it and implement it is the question.” I’m sure that’d fly!)
The Birddog 