Learn the name, people. You’re going to be talking about him for a long time to come.

The first overtime game in the 80-year history of Navy-Notre Dame became the first Navy win in the series since 1963, a 46-44 3OT thriller. There will be no more talking about the price of gas back then, no more talking about what the #1 song was, and no more talking about John F. Kennedy. And while I enjoy listening to anything Roger Staubach has to say, he never again will give another interview about being the quarterback of the last Navy team to beat Notre Dame. Because now, he isn’t. That title belongs to Kaipo-Noa Kaheaku-Enhada.

Kaipo was not intimidated by the big-game atmosphere. He thrived on it. When the Notre Dame Stadium crowd got loud, Kaipo would wave his arms to tell them to get louder. When the cameras were on him, Kaipo always had a smile on his face. He had boundless energy. He knew.

And knowing is what you’re taught at the Naval Academy. Paul Johnson talked to the players before and during the game, asking them, “Do you believe you can win?” With all due respect to PJ– and he’s due a whole hell of a lot of it– it isn’t about believing. It’s about knowing. It’s the difference between faith and confidence. You see, believing that you can do anything, while the theme for many a wonderful movie on the Disney Channel, is a bad thing in the military. Having faith in your own abilities means that eventually, you’ll bite off more than you can chew. When you do that, you endanger your own life as well as the lives of those around you. That isn’t what they teach at USNA. Instead, they teach training. Train yourself until you can’t get it wrong. Then, you don’t need faith; you have the confidence of experience. You know what you can do because you’ve done it before. And Kaipo knew. That’s the difference between this Navy team and the 43 that went before it. They all believed they could win. But this team knew. And when you know, all the crowd noise in the world won’t make a bit of difference, except to make the memory that much sweeter.

The way the Naval Academy motivates you to train is through fear. That sounds bad, but it isn’t. The very first thing that you’re taught as you walk through the gates on I-Day is that you, as an individual, no longer matter. You are simply a part of a team, and your own successes and failures are irrelevant next to those of the team. Ship, shipmate, self, as the saying goes. You train not to better yourself, but to better the team. And that’s where the fear comes in; you train because you are scared to death of letting down your teammates.

Enter Ram Vela. The Navy defense, leading Notre Dame 28-21 late in the 4th quarter, had forced the Irish to a 4th & 14 on their own 32 yard line. Ram came in untouched on a blitz. Just when it looked like he was going to get a sack that would have probably sealed a Navy victory, quarterback Evan Sharpley sidestepped the rush and delivered the ball to tight end John Carlson for a 1st down. Ram missed the tackle, and it gave Notre Dame new life. It could have been a catastrophic mistake. But on yet another 4th down play, Ram Vela was sent in on a blitz once again. This time, Vela had a blocker in his path. As the tailback went to block low, Vela would not be denied. The result was the above play, which will live forever as part of Navy football legend. Vela would not let down his teammates. He would not be stopped by any blocker. He would not be stopped by gravity. He would do his job. In the end, it was actually Chris Kuhar-Pitters who would get credit for the sack, which was a tremendous play of his own. But Vela taking flight will be the lasting image of the “not this time” attitude that defined the Navy team in this game.

On that note, I owe Ram and Buddy Green an apology. Last week, I wrote this:

If we’re going to send Ram Vela in on blitzes, then we might as well play defense with 10 people. He’s just too small, and he gets absorbed by the tackle every time. He’s a converted defensive back anyway. Just drop him into coverage. We’d probably be better off with him covering the TE than one of the other linebackers.

As it turns out, Buddy Green knows a little bit more about his players and the game of football than I do. Never in my life have I been so happy to be so wrong. And holy guacamole was I wrong.

Speaking of Buddy Green, he coached the game from the press box on Saturday. Chris Swezey noticed that too, and talked about it in his follow-up:

Saturday marked the first time since he came to Navy in 2002 that defensive coordinator Buddy Green spent the game in the coaches’ box rather than on the field. Johnson said the move was made to help Green see the field better, and that Green likely will be upstairs for the game against North Texas on Saturday.

I really think it made a difference. Navy still gave up a lot of yards to a bad offense, but Notre Dame ballcarriers didn’t have nearly the room to run that Navy’s previous opponents had. Players were in position to make plays, and Buddy Green put them there. Maybe that is the difference between those Navy defenses of years past and 2007. Maybe in previous years, Buddy didn’t have to sit in the booth because senior, experienced players already knew how to line up. We’ve seen the opposite before; a couple of years ago, Ken Niumatalolo was moved from the press box to the field because the offensive line was struggling at the time, and PJ thought they needed more hands-on leadership. Perhaps Buddy can better direct his young defense by seeing the bigger picture.

Team defense was improved, but Navy also put together a series of individual efforts that surpassed anything we’ve seen this year. With 4 sacks in the game, Navy nearly doubled its season total. Those sacks were set up in part by excellent coverage in the secondary. Seven different mids registered a tackle for a loss. Wyatt Middleton had 14 tackles. Freshman Kevin Edwards had 6 tackles and played tremendously in his first start. Nate Frazier played the way Navy fans knew he could, wrapping up 8 tackles and making the most underrated play of the game– in the second overtime, it was Nate who hit Evan Sharpley on 3rd down, causing a bad throw and holding Notre Dame to a field goal. And of course, the defense bailed out the offense twice; holding the Irish scoreless after a Shun White fumble in Navy territory, and scoring a touchdown of its own to give Navy its first lead of the game in the 4th quarter. This truly was a team victory.

Offensively, I wrote last week about the importance of manageable 3rd downs, and that we’d probably “play in a phone booth” as a result. For the most part, that’s what happened. Notre Dame focused on stopping the fullback. The spread formation is designed to open up running lanes by stretching the defense from sideline to sideline, but the Irish didn’t bother. They kept their linebackers between the tackles the entire game. To counter this, Paul Johnson brought his wide receivers in closer to the formation, and stayed that way for almost the entire game. This opened up outside runs by allowing wide receivers to make crackback blocks on linebackers attempting inside-out pursuit. When Notre Dame was forced to adjust, that’s when the fullback started to gain some yardage.

It wasn’t the most mind-blowing game on the stat sheet, with Navy totaling only 338 yards of offense. The statistics don’t tell the story of how well the offense played, though. They executed the gameplan with very few mistakes. Navy only averaged 3.9 yards per rush, but that was by design. The goal was to set up 3rd & short. Coach Johnson was asked about the importance of manageable 3rd downs in his postgame press conference:

It’s real important, and that’s why I call plays the way I do. There was probably some things that we could’ve had in the passing game. But there’s no use in taking a chance when you know you’re going to get four downs. I’m not real smart in math, but 3 a pop will get you 10 in four tries. That’s kind of the way we play, and the way we have to play where we are.

The most impressive performance of the whole afternoon might be that of the offensive line. This is the first Navy-Notre Dame game I can remember where the Navy o-line wasn’t just effective; they were dominant.

Does it matter that this Notre Dame team is no good compared to the last couple of years? No. Navy had lost to bad Notre Dame teams as well as good ones over the last 44 years. And nobody seems to remember that the team that Navy beat in 1963 only won two games. Does it matter that Charlie Weis made some questionable coaching decisions? No. That’s part of the game sometimes. As time goes on, all people remember is the final score. That, and superhuman sacks.

Extra Point: Charlie Weis and Notre Dame deserve a lot of credit for the grace with which they handled the loss. I was never as caught up in the Weis love-fest as most people when he led the Irish over to join Navy in singing Blue and Gold in 2005. I thought he did it because the cameras were on. It’s easy to be gracious after a win. But Weis showed that he was just as gracious in defeat. Not only did he lead his team to the Navy fans to sing Blue and Gold, but he also went out of his way to shake the hands of several Navy players. Some Irish fans have been blasting Weis for the comments he made to a sideline reporter after the game, but I heard nothing to be offended about as a Navy fan. Weis’ playcalling might be subject to criticism, but the graciousness with which he conducted himself afterwards should not.

Seeing Notre Dame fans line the tunnel to the locker room after the game, giving Navy players high-fives, was pretty cool too. I saw more of a connection between these two schools than I ever saw out of Air Force, a school that Navy is “supposed” to regard as a sibling.

I said that a Navy win would be a media bonanza, and here it is:

Mids end 43 years of losing

Ecstatic Navy finally has something to shout about

Bury the hatchet job: I’m here to praise Navy and classy Charlie

ND Torpedoed

Party Time in T-Court!

Irish sink to new low

Beating ND even stops topping Army

Navy earned its victory over ND

ND Woeful, but Navy’s win still big

Now, nothing really matters

Wow, what a game

I was born in America’s finest city, San Diego. My childhood consisted of summer days at the beach. I remember my first Padres game and my first Chargers game. I graduated from a good high school. I was sworn in on I-Day, and 10 months later I climbed Herndon. I was commissioned on a glorious May morning in 1999. I reported to my first ship. I felt the excitement of pulling into my first foreign port in Palermo, Italy. I’ve returned from two extended deployments. I earned my surface warfare pin. I married the woman of my dreams on a beautiful summer night, on a yacht sailing the Potomac and overlooking Washington’s monuments. I was present for the birth of both of my children. My brother found a miraculous match on the bone marrow donor list that allowed him to beat leukemia. I have been unbelievably blessed, and have experienced far more than my fair share of wonderful things.

But today is the happiest day of my life.

Well, this is it.

Army-Navy is the most important game on Navy’s schedule every year. But when it comes to nervous anticipation the week before, there’s no game bigger than Notre Dame. For some people, it’s about The Streak. For others, it’s just about playing on a big stage. Back before there were hundreds of college football games televised every week, the Notre Dame and Army games were the only chance for Navy fans around the country to see their team. One way or another, it’s our annual opportunity to see how our underdog Navy team stacks up with take on college football royalty.

And make no mistake; despite their 1-7 record, Notre Dame is still college football royalty. Notre Dame’s problems have fired up the “this is the year” crusaders more than usual, both among Navy fans and in the media. It’s hard not to think that way. With an offense ranked dead last in I-A, it would seem as if the Irish would be the perfect tonic to cure what ails the Navy defense. Yeah, right. If you find yourself thinking this at some point, ask yourself: even with all of their problems, do you think that Charlie Weis would trade any of his players for ours? No way. So don’t be fooled. Notre Dame is still Notre Dame. When they have problems, they have them at a whole different level than we do.

Of course, they do have problems. With graduation losses and a schedule full of titans, everybody expected the offense to take a step back. A step, maybe, but not a Bob Beamon long jump. Despite being coached by a supposed offensive genius, Notre Dame’s offense has hit rock bottom. Genius status is apparently much harder to maintain when neither Tom Brady nor Brady Quinn are running your offense. Defensively, Notre Dame is better than what they might look like statistically. Notre Dame is 112th in the country in time of posession, so the defense is on the field a lot. They did give the Irish their lone win of the season, forcing 6 turnovers (including a fumble returned for a TD) in a 20-6 victory.

A lot of attention is being given to the matchup between the underachieving Irish offense and the miserable Navy defense, but it’s on the other side of the ball that I’m the most curious. Navy has been able to move the ball decently against Notre Dame the last few years, but Notre Dame has a new look. Under new defensive coordinator Corwin Brown, the Irish have switched to a 3-4 defense. This would seem to de-emphasize Notre Dame’s traditional strength vs. Navy, the defensive line. I can’t even begin to count how many times we’ve seen a speedy Notre Dame defensive end track down the quarterback from the backside of a slow-developing option play. And then there’s some mystery around Brown himself. When was the last time he faced an option offense? He spent the last 3 years in the NFL as a defensive backs coach. Prior to that, he spent three years at Virginia, but as a special teams coordinator. That came after a 6-year NFL playing career. His last year as a player at Michigan was 1993, and none of the teams he faced were as option-heavy as Navy. So you can look at this in two ways: either A) Brown has no idea how to defend the option and Navy will run all over Notre Dame; or B) there is hardly any film on Brown’s defenses that Paul Johnson will be able to use, so Navy won’t be as well-prepared offensively as they had in the past. The “glass half full or half empty” test, Navy-style.

Anyway, it’s hard to tell you anything that you don’t already know about Notre Dame, since they’re the most heavily covered team in the country. Here are a few things I’ll be watching for during the game:

1st & 2nd down: Navy’s offense is 2nd in the country in 3rd down conversions this year. That’s because they usually get 3-4 yards apiece on 1st and 2nd down. Since he doesn’t pass much, Paul Johnson isn’t left trying to convert after an incomplete pass leads to 2nd & 10. Notre Dame’s defense has had some trouble getting off the field at times, allowing opposing offenses to convert on nearly 43% of their 3rd downs. The opportunity is there for Navy to prolong drives if they keep 3rd down manageable. Don’t be surprised if Navy plays “in a phone booth,” content run the fullback and quarterback all day. Of course, the health of Kaipo’s neck might be an issue again if that’s the case.

Navy’s defense is even worse than Notre Dame’s in giving up 3rd down conversions, giving up a 1st down 53% of the time. Unlike Navy, though, the Irish offense only converts 25% of the time on. So something’s got to give, and given the difference in the competition against whom each unit has compiled these numbers, that something is probably going to be the Navy defense. But maybe not every time. Giving up 3rd & long is sort of our thing, but Notre Dame is shaky enough on offense to make some mistakes– dropped passes, overthrown balls… That’s what I’m telling myself, anyway.

What’s the gameplan? Notre Dame hasn’t been able to do much of anything offensively, averaging 188 yards of total offense per game (34 rushing, 154 passing). So which part of the offense does Charlie Weis feel like getting on track this week?

Navy’s Offensive line: The Navy line has been the heart of the offense, but it suffered its first casualty of the season last week. Andrew McGinn is out for the Notre Dame game, and will be replaced in the rotation by Ricky Moore.

Here we go again: The “here we go again” factor will be in full effect tomorrow for both teams. I think it’s important for Navy to score first, or to at least take an early lead. It isn’t often that Notre Dame will enter this game at 1-7. Navy needs to take advantage of it. If they can get an early lead, then Notre Dame might start to panic a little and force some things. If Notre Dame gets an early lead, then 43 years of doubt starts to creep to the surface and Navy panics. Momentum will be important in this game.

I guess I might as well get it over with.

Anyone who writes about Navy and Notre Dame is expected to talk about The Streak. I would rather not, but there’s really no avoiding it.

I hate The Streak, although not for the reasons you think.

I hate The Streak because I think it is overrated. Notre Dame is, as Tony Kornheiser puts it, the “University of College Football in America.” The Naval Academy is a 4000-student military school. Notre Dame coaches go into a kid’s living room and tell him, “Come to Notre Dame, son. You’ll be treated like a king and be heir to the greatest college football tradition in the country, setting you up nicely for the NFL.” Navy coaches go into a kid’s living room and tell him, “Come to the Naval Academy, son. You’ll be treated like goat dung for your first year, then serve 5 years in the military after you graduate!” WTF do people expect is going to happen when these two teams play? In this environment, Navy beating Notre Dame would be miraculous. Are miracles supposed to happen more than once every 43 years or something? Notre Dame is supposed to beat Navy.

I hate The Streak because Navy fans are obsessed with it. There’s always the eternally optimistic crowd that thinks thinks every year is “the year.” Then there’s the crowd that starts talking about next year’s game about 45 minutes after this year’s game ends, and doesn’t stop talking about it until kickoff a year later. I’m not just talking about the message board crowd here. In Paul Johnson’s postgame press conference after beating Air Force, some unidentified guy asked him about Notre Dame. Are you kidding me? We just won the first leg of the CIC Trophy round robin and have a three game stretch of Pitt, Wake Forest, and Delaware coming up, and this guy asks about Notre Dame? And then, of course, there’s John Feinstein. The columnist and Navy radio color analyst talks all the time about how he thinks Navy and Notre Dame shouldn’t play every year. Of course, the week’s opponent might be Ball State, but Notre Dame will be the topic of conversation. If you’re a Navy football fan, chances are that you have Notre Dame on the brain.

Don’t get me wrong; I want to beat Notre Dame as much as anyone. But for me, it isn’t about The Streak as much as it’s about what that win would do for meeting each year’s goals. A win over Notre Dame, no matter how much they are struggling, would be a media bonanza. This year, beating Notre Dame would be a huge boost to a team coming off of a bad loss. Not only that, but the difference between 5-4 and 4-5 is huge. This isn’t a big game because it would snap a 43-game losing streak; it’s a big game because it would prevent a 3-game losing streak.

I’m just as sick as you are of seeing Roger Staubach highlights every year captioned with the words, “The last time Navy won” or something to that effect. And while I understand the logic, I was just as annoyed as everyone else the way the talking heads have assumed that Notre Dame would end the year on a 4-game winning streak, beginning with Navy. But that’s not what’s important here. What’s important is that this Navy team has a lot left to accomplish, and a win this week would be a huge step in the right direction.

I had typed up a big long piece breaking down the Delaware game. I was ready to post it, but as I proofread it one last time I thought to myself, “Why?” Was I going to tell you guys anything that you didn’t already know? Do you really need to hear the same story again and again? This game was like every other game. The defense is incompetent. Therefore, if Navy is going to win, the offense must be flawless. It was not. Two turnovers and a holding penalty are all it took to put this game out of reach, and now Navy is staring 4-5 in the face.

As you already know, Navy’s defense is bad. They are probably the worst defense in the country right now. I don’t think that’s really up for debate. The question is where this defense ranks on a historical scale. Is this the worst defense of all time? It’s hard to do a statistical comparison because the NCAA record book doesn’t keep very many records for futility. Navy is ranked close to the bottom in both total defense and scoring defense this year. They aren’t at the very bottom because Navy’s offense is in the top 20 in both total offense and scoring offense; the lack of 3 & outs means that the defense sees fewer posessions than most teams in a game. But one statistic that the defense can’t be bailed out by the offense on is pass efficiency defense, and Navy’s performance this year HAS to be an all-time record. Navy is dead last in pass efficiency defense this year, and by an incredibly large margin. Rice is ranked #118, with a rating of 157.37. That’s pretty bad, but it’s less than three points worse than #117, Central Michigan. A quick glance down the list shows that the incremental difference between each ranking position is less than one in most cases, increasing to 1 or 2 towards the end. The difference between Rice and Navy, though, is more than 14 points! Navy isn’t even on the same planet as the rest of I-A. Navy’s pass efficiency defense rating is 171.46. To put that into perspective, the quarterback that leads I-A in pass efficiency is Tim Tebow at 176.5. That means that every quarterback that plays Navy essentially becomes Tim Tebow. The quarterback collective that has faced Navy’s defense this year has a pass efficiency rating higher than those of Graham Harrell, Brian Brohm, Dennis Dixon, and Colt Brennan. I actually feel sorry for fans of the teams we face who come out of their game against Navy thinking that their quarterback is better than he really is, like he had turned some kind of corner against the Mids. That hope always comes crashing down the following week when he faces a defense that actually forces a punt sometimes. Most offenses get a stiffer challenge from their scout team.

I don’t know football well enough to pretend like I know how to fix this mess. I don’t. I don’t even know what the problem really is. I know that we’re young and inexperienced and hurt badly by injuries, but we aren’t the first defense to face these issues. It’s one thing to be bad, but this is bad on a biblical scale. Maybe that’s it. God might be punishing us for something. Frogs, pestilence, boils, and a lousy defense. If the Severn turns red, you’ll know what’s up. You hear that, Supe? That’s God telling you to let His people go.

Which brings me to the title of this post. Temple, you suck. You must have the worst offense in history if you only gained 273 yards on this defense. Other teams gain that much in a half against Navy. For shame, Owls.

I don’t have much else to say, really. I’ll just go stream-of-consciousness style and add some of my notes from the game:

— There was a brief moment early in the game when I thought the defense was going to be OK. Delaware started a drive in bad field position after committing a penalty on a kickoff. Nate Frazier and Chris Kuhar-Pitters capped off a 3 & out with a sack. In reality, Delaware just got very conservative with their playcalling when their backs were to the goal line.

— It seemed to me that Navy blitzed more frequently in the first half than they had in earlier games. They were forced to stop when Delaware started making big gains on screen passes.

— If we’re going to send Ram Vela in on blitzes, then we might as well play defense with 10 people. He’s just too small, and he gets absorbed by the tackle every time. He’s a converted defensive back anyway. Just drop him into coverage. We’d probably be better off with him covering the TE than one of the other linebackers.

— The Nate Frazier Memorial Ulcer is in full effect.

— We should stop deferring to the second half if we win the coin toss. If the offense has to score on every posession anyway, we might as well get a leg up by scoring first.

— PJ’s playcalling had a definite flow to it during the game. Delaware seemed like it was selling out to stop the fullback at the beginning of each drive. PJ answered with the toss sweep. Once Delaware would adjust to that, PJ would fake the toss sweep and give to the fullback on the dive. That play would be good for 7-8 yards almost every time, including Adam Ballard’s 55-yard TD rumble.

— Apparently Kaipo is still hurt. Usually PJ doesn’t even bother to hand the ball off at the goal line, preferring instead to keep things simple and have the quarterback run it in. On Saturday, the fullbacks got a lot more goal line carries than usual. My guess is that PJ didn’t want someone coming off of a neck injury to be putting his head down and pushing. That’s also why he came out of the game. Delaware lined up in a 4-4 most of the afternoon, with 2 CBs and a safety. The safety was spying on the whichever slotback went in tail motion. PJ tried to run the counter option to throw the safety off, but it didn’t work too well; the counter option is more of an adjustment based on line play rather than the secondary. Since the counter option wasn’t working, PJ switched to the midline option. With the safety covering the slotback, PJ essentially took the safety out of the play by forcing him to cover someone who isn’t going to get the ball (in the midline, the motion slotback is a blocker). The midline is a tough, up-the-middle kind of play, not suited to someone who has an injured neck and isn’t inclined to put his head down and take a hit. Jarod has been a little more comfortable running inside than Kaipo anyway, so the switch made sense based on what Delaware was doing.

Navy’s defense sucks.
It might be the worst ever.
Why do we bother?

Usually when a I-A team and a I-AA team meet on the football field, it’s the I-AA team that plays the “no respect” card. Not this week, as Delaware receiver Aaron Love decided to channel his inner Shaun Carney:

“Athletically, I think we’re just as good as Navy, if not better,” junior wide receiver Aaron Love said. “We shouldn’t have any problem winning this game.”

There are those who would say that this isn’t arrogance; it’s just confidence. Or perhaps, unbeknownst to the rest of us, Mr. Love is some kind of expert talent evaluator. But really? “Shouldn’t have any problem?” Can you imagine if it was a Navy player who said that? The Delaware media would erupt, and Chuck Atwater would spontaneously combust. There would be an uproar on both sides of the Chesapeake, with no end to the “respect” talk. Now it isn’t as if Navy is without reproach or that Delaware is without talent, but that isn’t the point. There are people who say that bulletin board material doesn’t make a difference once the game is underway, and that’s probably true. Where it makes a difference is in the week of practice before the game. If Delaware thought that they were catching Navy at a good time, in a week sandwiched between the defending ACC champion and the annual clash with Notre Dame, they can forget that now. I’m guessing that lack of focus isn’t a problem for Paul Johnson’s team this week.

(As a side note, it seems that part of the mantra of Delaware fans is that Paul Johnson is a jerk. I find it funny that they’ll say so in one breath, then defend Love’s comments in the next breath. )

But that’s enough message board nonsense for now. On to the game.

Scheduling Rhode Island seems to be a trendy thing to do for some of Navy’s opponents lately. Connecticut did it last year, and Army squeaked by URI earlier this season. The Rams are coached by Tim Stowers, who took over as Georgia Southern’s offensive coordinator when Paul Johnson left for Hawaii and was relieved by Paul Johnson as GSU’s head coach after the 1996 season. Under Stowers, Rhode Island runs a spread option offense that is similar to Paul Johnson’s. Playing against the Rams gives coaches a an extra week to prepare for Navy’s offense– in theory, anyway. In reality, all it really does is put their defensive game plan on film for Johnson to pick apart. UConn experienced this last year, as PJ noticed that the Huskies seemed to have figured out Rhody’s audibles. On Navy’s first play against UConn, PJ had the offense look like Brian Hampton had called a run audible before the ball was snapped. Johnson called a play-action pass, though, and Reggie Campbell got behind the defense for a 77-yard touchdown reception. That was the beginning of a long day for UConn, as Navy rolled up 605 yards of offense.

Obviously, the Rhode Island scheduling strategy didn’t work. This year, Delaware has played URI, although they did so because they’re in the same conference, not because they wanted to get ready for Navy. Whatever the reason, I was excited about the prospects of PJ breaking down that film– until he revealed earlier this week that he didn’t even have tape of that game. Bummer. Without it, the best film to use to prepare for this game is probably the Navy-Delaware game from 2004. So let’s take a look at that game.

On offense, Delaware came out with 4-5 wide receivers on almost every play. Sonny Riccio threw 50 passes as the Blue Hens attempted to nickel & dime their way past Navy’s defense. There weren’t many throws downfield; Riccio’s 30-for-50 passing performance resulted in only 255 yards. There also wasn’t much running, as they rushed for only 59 yards on the day.

Delaware will still try to nickel and dime their way down the field, but this year’s squad has a whole new element: Omar Cuff. Cuff played in that 2004 game as a freshman, but had only 5 carries. It was his second game as a running back. He began 2004 as a defensive back, but was switched to RB halfway through the season. That move paid some large dividends for the Blue Hens, as he had 4 100- yard games over the second half of the season including a 170-yard performance in the playoffs against William and Mary. Cuff showed that his performance was no fluke, following up that freshman campaign by being named a third-team All-American his sophomore year. After missing four games last year due to an ankle sprain, Cuff has regained his All-American form, having already rushed for 863 yards and 20(!) touchdowns through seven games. He had 200 yards in the Blue Hens’ last game vs. Northeastern, and was the talk of the college football world in Week 1 following a 244-yard, 6 TD performance at William and Mary.

Schematically, Delaware’s offense matches up very well against the Navy defense. Navy plays soft to prevent the big play, but Delaware doesn’t try to throw deep very often. Our friend Mr. Love leads the team with 32 catches for 442 yards, but his longest reception of the year is only 27 yards. Quarterback Joe Flacco is bigger and more accurate than Sonny Riccio. If you think that Navy can sit back and wait for the Blue Hens to make a mistake, think again; Flacco completes 73% of his passes and has thrown only 3 interceptions, while Cuff fumbles at a rate of 1 out of every 100 touches. Delaware’s offense isn’t going to beat themselves and will be content to throw the short pass all day long. Not coincidentally, they are ranked 5th in I-AA in total offense. And while it’s true that Delaware’s impressive statistics have come against a schedule that doesn’t exactly take your breath away, I wouldn’t put too much stock in that. If Navy had been able to stop anyone up to this point, I might take some solace in Delaware’s opposition. Delaware might be untested, but Navy hasn’t shown the ability to test anyone themselves. With yet another freshman looking like he’s going to get some more playing time this week (Emmett Merchant), it’s Navy’s defense that is going to get the test.

Things look a little better for Navy on the other side of the ball. Kaipo was able to shake off his neck injury and has been practicing all week, so the offense should be healthy. Having Kaipo back is good news for a team that’s about to face I-AA’s 8th-ranked run defense. But what’s the story behind that lofty ranking? We’ve said it before; statistics are as much a factor of who you’ve played as they are of how you’ve played. I’m not referring to Delaware’s strength of schedule, either. Teams that play Navy tend to see their pass defense ranking vault up the charts. That isn’t because our opponents play good pass defense; it’s because Navy doesn’t pass. The same can be said of Delaware’s opponents so far this season. The highest ranked rushing offense that Delaware has faced is Rhode Island’s, which is ranked #12 in that category and racks up 242 yards per game. While Delaware did hold the Rams to 187 yards on the ground, that isn’t necessarily a big accomplishment. Rhode Island isn’t very good. For an apples to apples comparison, let’s look at Rhody’s game vs. Army. The Woops have the 88th-ranked run defense in I-A, and they held Rhode Island even fewer rushing yards than Delaware– 158. Outside of Rhode Island, the Blue Hens have faced rushing offenses ranked only 59, 72, 78, 89, and 108 in I-AA. Even West Chester, Delaware’s annual Division II opponent, is only ranked 61st in D-II rushing offense. Delaware’s rushing defense looks more impressive than it really is because they play teams that don’t run.

But maybe we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Let’s assume for a minute that Delaware’s run defense isn’t overrated; let’s say that it is merely untested. Even if that is the case, defending more conventional rushing offenses is not the same as defending the triple option– Paul Johnson’s offense in particular. That 2004 game is the perfect example of this. If you disregard their game against Navy that year, Delaware gave up only 96 rushing yards per game. That would have been good for 5th in I-AA. It didn’t mean much against Navy, who ran for 346 yards against Delaware that year and dropped the Blue Hens all the way to #20 in run defense. A bad rushing defense is usually going to have a tough time with Navy. A good one, though, isn’t guaranteed to do much better.

In 2004, Delaware’s defense lined up with a 5-man front. The two middle linebackers also played close to the line of scrimmage, meaning that seven players were geared toward stopping the fullback dive play. The secondary played straight man-to-man, with each safety taking a slotback. Both safeties played fairly deep, but as soon as one of them read that it was going to be a running play, he would come crashing down on the slotback at full speed to close the gap.

It didn’t work too well. With so many people committed to stopping the dive and a secondary focused on the pitch man, there really wasn’t anyone left to stop the quarterback. Not surprisingly, Aaron Polanco ran for 3 TDs that day. The one-on-one coverage opened up the passing game too, as Polanco was 8 of 11 through the air with yet another touchdown.

Actually, man-to-man coverage creates several opportunities in this offense. When the slotback goes into tail motion, he takes the safety with him. The most obvious play that opens up is the quick throw to the wide receiver in the flat. When the slotback takes the safety with him to the other side of the formation, it leaves a wide receiver one-on-one with a corner, who now has no safety help. If the receiver can make the first man miss, he stands to have a lot of room to run. Seven of Polanco’s eight completions went to wide receivers. Man-to-man defense also opens up the reverse. The corner who was covering the pitch wide receiver can be picked off by a slotback. With both safeties on the same side of the formation thanks to tail motion, nobody is left to stay home on what the defense thought would be the backside of the play. Jason Tomlinson ran one for 32 yards. Finally, Delaware’s defensive alignment also left the fullback option wide open. Kyle Eckel ran for 143 yards, with the bulk of that yardage coming outside the tackles. If Delaware lines up the same way they did in 2004, there’s no teling how many yards Navy will pile up this week.

So it looks like another high-scoring game yet again. The faint of heart– and those who like defense– should probably skip this one.

The way Navy’s defense has played this year, one mistake by the offense has been enough to put a game out of reach. Three mistakes, and it’s sure to result in a blowout. After Navy’s offense gave up three turnovers on Saturday afternoon, that’s exactly what happened. A homecoming crowd of nearly 37,000 saw Kenny Moore catch 15 passes for 181 yards as Wake Forest thumped Navy, 44-24. The loss, which brought Navy’s record down to 4-3, was the result of poor play in all three phases of the game for the Mids. We’ll start with the offense.

Navy had rallied back from a 14-3 deficit to take a 17-14 lead after a Shun White touchdown run in the second quarter. Wake tied it up with a field goal on their next drive, and Navy took posession on their own 20 following the kickoff. It was at that point that everything pretty much went to hell. On the second play of the drive, Kaipo had barely turned around after carrying out his fake on a counter option when he was met by a blitzing Aaron Curry. The force of Curry’s accelerating 240-pound frame was delivered directly to Kaipo’s face, whipping the quarterback’s neck back and knocking him out of the game. Jarod Bryant stepped in and was promptly blindsided on the next play as he brought his arm back to pass, causing a fumble that was scooped up and returned for a Wake Forest touchdown.

I wrote earlier that the key to Navy’s first two losses this year was turnovers. The third loss was no exception; three Navy turnovers turned into 17 Wake Forest points. The normally sure-handed Eric Kettani fumbled on the Wake 24 as Navy was driving in the third quarter. Jarod Bryant fumbled a snap on the next drive, giving Wake Forest the ball at the Navy 39. And just like that, a game that looked like it was on its way to 34-31 turned into a 44-24 debacle.

Kaipo’s injury was the key play of the game. Navy had three scores on its first three posessions with Kaipo at the helm, but managed only one more (along with three turnovers) the rest of the way. The offense is just a more efficient machine with Kaipo in charge. That’s not a slap at Jarod Bryant as much as it is the reality of developing quarterbacks in this offense. Time and repetition mean everything, and Navy fans have been spoiled with a long line of senior quarterbacks ready to take over year after year. Kaipo isn’t a senior, but the experience that he already has in this offense is comparable to the experience that Navy’s previous senior signal callers have had. While Jarod is a classmate of Kaipo’s, he just doesn’t have the same foundation in the offense, and it shows.

Jarod gets a lot of praise for being a “decisive” runner; Scott Zolak wouldn’t stop using that word during the CSTV broadcast. People say that Jarod appears to be more confident cutting upfield. It’s an illusion. The reality is that Jarod looks decisive because he doesn’t make reads very well. Contrary to what you’re supposed to do when running the option, Jarod decides where he’s going to go with the ball before it’s snapped. If his pre-snap decision happens to take what the defense ends up giving him, then it looks like a “decisive read.” Unfortunately, for every “decisive read,” there’s a play that gets stuffed because the ball went to the wrong option. Paul Johnson recognizes this and does his best to call plays where Jarod can succeed. Think back to Jarod’s biggest plays this season. How many were on predetermined carries? The comeback against Duke was engineered using QB draws. Yesterday, the big plays on the opening drive of the second half came on the midline option, which is the easiest read for the quarterback to make (he only has one key). But you can only draw from that well so many times. Calling these plays can give a defense a different look for a drive or two at the end of the game, but defenses will be able to adjust if they have a whole half to do so. And that’s exactly what Wake Forest did.

It isn’t just in the option game that Jarod is deciding where to go before the snap; he did it in the passing game as well. On two occasions Jarod threw to a double-covered slotback on a wheel route when there was a receiver running wide open on a post pattern over the middle. Jarod never made the progression to his secondary receiver. In fairness, getting hit from behind in the second quarter probably didn’t make Jarod comfortable standing and looking for too long. Nevertheless, those became missed opportunities.

We’ve seen these kinds of struggles from non-senior quarterbacks under Paul Johnson before. Craig Candeto was far more effective in 2003 than he was the previous year. Aaron Polanco looked shaky in his one start in 2002 before stepping in two years later and leading Navy to a 10-2 record. Brian Hampton had a lot of the same problems with pre-determining ballcarriers and receivers before he took over the offense in 2006 and led them to 400 rushing yards in his first game. Jarod is progressing the same way that his predecessors did, but Kaipo’s injury compressed that timeline.

Turnovers were only the beginning of Navy’s problems. Defensively, nobody could stop Kenny Moore. Nobody could get to Riley Skinner, either. As a result, Wake Forest was 10 for 14 on 3rd down conversions. Four of those conversions came on passes to Moore. For the second week in a row Navy’s defense was able to stop the run once in a while on first and second down, only to give up a first down on 3rd and long. Navy had a chance to stop Wake Forest on each of its first three scoring drives, putting the Deacs in 3rd & 6 or more 4 times. Combine the 17 points scored on those drives with the 17 points that Wake scored off of Navy turnovers, and you account for nearly all of their scoring in the game.

The run defense has been inconsistent all year, but in the last couple of games they’ve been able to make a play here and there. Irv Spencer had a season-high 3 tackles for a loss this week. But when those plays set up a 3rd & long, the complete lack of a pass rush gives opposing quarterbacks all the time in the world to make a play, both through the air and with their legs. Navy has never exactly been a sack factory, but averaging less than one sack every two games is insanely low even by Navy standards. It’s especially disappointing given the high hopes that Navy fans had for Nate Frazier and Andy Lark. Physically, they remind you of Babatunde Akingbemi. Yet they haven’t looked like him on the field. Or have they? Akingbemi’s 2004 season was a thing of beauty, but he wasn’t nearly as effective as a junior in 2003. Having a big body is one thing; learning to use it is another. Akingbemi didn’t become a good nose guard until he refined his technique. I suspect the same can be said for Nate and Andy; they really aren’t that far removed from playing games in high school or prep school where they could get away with just overpowering their opponents with sheer physical superiority. That doesn’t fly in Division I football. Like Jarod Bryant, they are probably both a year away from being truly effective. Unfortunately, that doesn’t do this year’s defense much good.

Something else that isn’t doing the Navy defense much good is Navy’s special teams– or more specifically, the kick return coverage. Between Navy’s turnovers and Kevin Marion’s kickoff returns, Wake Forest enjoyed excellent field position all afternoon. That set the defense up for failure. In fact, the defense actually played reasonably well when they didn’t start a drive with their backs against the wall. Wake Forest had 10 drives in the game. Five of those drives started on their own 40 yard line or better. One of those drives was at the end of the game as Jim Grobe ran out the clock. The other four resulted in 28 points. Wake Forest had 5 drives where they had to drive 70 yards or more, and those 5 drives yielded only 9 points. When they were given some field to work with, the defense did its job. It’s hard to believe when you see 44 points on the scoreboard, but the defense was actually a little bit better this week. Not good by any stretch of the imagination… But better.

That’s a mighty thin silver lining, though. It was an ugly game, and Navy can’t afford to have many more like it.