GAME WEEK: PITT

They say that good things come to those who wait. “They,” however, usually doesn’t include college athletic directors, at least when it comes to football. The tattered and discarded remains of college coaching careers cut short by trigger-happy ADs are like prairie dog roadkill on a back road in Utah. They’re everywhere. To say that coaching football is a “what have you done for me lately” business would be an understatement. Nowadays, the football team’s success is 90% of what determines a successful AD. Every other program could be on probation, but if the football team is winning, then all is well. On the other hand, your school could have dynasties in soccer, swimming, and women’s basketball, but if they aren’t going to bowl games, then that AD is on the hot seat. Football is king, and athletic directors want to hitch their wagons to stars. Time to produce results is a premium for the newly hired.

Naturally, there are exceptions to this phenomenon. Rutgers was coming off of its sixth straight losing season when it hired Greg Schiano as head coach in 2000. Things didn’t exactly improve right away. Schiano led the Scarlet Knights to to four more losing seasons, including 2-9 and 1-11 campaigns in his first two years, before breaking through for a 7-5 record and a bowl game in 2005. Then there’s the curious case of Dave Wannstedt.

Unlike Schiano, who inherited a team that was absolutely terrible, Wannstedt was put in charge of a Pitt team that had seen some modest success. His predecessor at Pitt, Walt Harris, had led the Panthers to a 52-44 record over seven seasons. In the year before Wannstedt was hired, Pitt went 8-4 and won a share of the Big East title, earning a berth in the Fiesta Bowl– the team’s fifth straight bowl game. But even though the team had clearly improved under Harris’ watch, he had come under fire. Harris left Pittsburgh for Stanford at the end of that Fiesta Bowl season, but it was rumored that he did so because Pitt probably would’ve fired him anyway. The Panthers had gotten good, but not good enough. They were stricken with nextlevelitis. If the rumors were true, and Harris was going to be shown the door, it makes Wannstedt’s tenure at Pitt all the more curious. Pitt has yet to finish with a winning record since he’s been hired. They looked well on their way in 2006, starting the season 6-1. They ended the season with five straight losses. Last year, Wannstedt limped into the last game of the season with a 4-7 record, but was still awarded a contract extension. It boggled the mind.

On the other hand, maybe there’s a reason why the peanut gallery is the peanut gallery, while other people get paid to make these decisions. In the first game after signing his new contract, Wannstedt took his Pitt team into Morgantown and upset a motivated West Virginia squad that was playing for a berth in the BCS championship game. And this year, after a season-opening upset loss to Bowling Green, Pitt has rolled off four straight wins to make a return appearance in the top 25. One thing that Dave Wannstedt has always been given credit for is his recruiting, particularly in western Pennsylvania. As those younger players have matured, Pitt has started winning games that they would have lost last year. The Panthers have found themselves trailing in the fourth quarter of their last three games, but kept their composure and found ways to pull out victories. The last of those wins was an upset of #10 USF in Tampa that some in the media suggest will finally be the springboard to the Big East success that fans expected when the former NFL head man was hired.

LeSean McCoy
LeSean McCoy

The Pitt formula is simple and familiar; play defense and run the football. Their defense is ranked 27th nationally and anchored by linebacker Scott McKillop, who led the nation in tackles last year with 12.6 per game. Running back LeSean McCoy should need no introduction after running for 165 yards and three TDs against the Mids last year. McCoy set the Big East record for rushing yards by a freshman with 1,328; averaging 106 yards per game so far in his sophomore season, he’s picked up right where he left off. Those two should be familiar to you, but quarterback Bill Stull might not be. Stull missed most of the 2007 season with an injured thumb and did not play against Navy. His numbers won’t blow anyone away, but his 205 passing yards per game are second in the Big East. Ideally, the way to defend Pitt would be the same way that Navy defended Wake Forest: stop the run, disrupt the short passing game, and force Stull to throw downfield (which isn’t his strength). That is a whole lot easier said than done, though. Wake Forest did not have a running back like LeSean McCoy, and Pitt’s offensive line, to put it delicately, doesn’t miss very many meals. McCoy has 28 carries in each of Pitt’s last two games, and you can probably count on that trend to continue. Wannstadt will run him until the Navy defense proves it can stop him. Last year, they never did.

Stull isn’t the only quarterback in this matchup that’s different from 2007. Coach Niumatalolo confirmed at his press briefing after Wednesday’s practice that Jarod Bryant would be starting ahead of Kaipo. Kaipo is healthy enough to play in an emergency, but apparently not enough to play a full game. That’s bad news for Navy fans. I mentioned last week about how the offense flows from the triple option. Last year’s Pitt game gives us a great example, which we can take a look at here (at the risk of stealing my own thunder for future posts).

The basic idea for a quarterback in reading the give key is doing the opposite of what the defender commits to. If he takes the fullback, you keep; if he takes you, you give to the fullback. But what if the key doesn’t commit to either one? That’s called a “squat;” basically, the key is reading the quarterback the same way the quarterback is reading him. He doesn’t make a clear move to take either the dive or the keep. Take a look at the highlighted player here. He doesn’t commit on the snap; he only moves on the fullback after he sees that the fullback has the ball:

Once the coaches see the tendencies of the defense, they can exploit them. Paul Johnson did just that. Navy’s offense gained two first downs on the first three plays of its next drive. They did it by taking advantage of the squatting read, then anticipating his adjustments. The first play called on this drive was the fullback trap. When the DE sees the fullback get the ball, he commits. But when he does, he’s trapped by a pulling guard, leaving the fullback free to run wild. Because the DE squats, the guard has enough time to get to him and block him. Now that the DE has learned his lesson, he won’t squat anymore. He’ll cheat towards that fullback right away to make sure that the guard can’t block him in time. Knowing how the DE would probably react to being trapped, PJ could anticipate it and call the right play to take advantage of it; as we learned in an earlier post, DEs that cheat towards the middle set up the counter option play. That’s play number two. And once PJ was done picking on that DE, he simply repeated the process on the other side.

You know how sometimes you hear about thinking two or three plays ahead? This is the sort of thing they’re talking about.

But the important thing as it relates to tomorrow’s game is that it all flowed from how the defense was playing the triple option. Without that to start from, the real adjustments to take advantage of the defense can’t occur. And that’s where Jarod comes in. We know that for whatever reason, he just can’t seem to run the triple option play. Every week I allow myself to think that maybe this is the week when the light finally turns on for Jarod, and every week I realize that I’m just setting myself up. Before the Air Force game I said that as long as Navy didn’t turn the ball over, they would win by virtue of simply having more playmakers. This isn’t the case against Pitt. With players like McKillop and McCoy, Navy isn’t going to win on talent alone. They are going to need the full arsenal of the offense, but under Jarod Bryant it just hasn’t happened. The coaches try not to focus on him too much, talking about how the line could block better. But don’t you think it’s a little odd that the offensive line happens to play poorly when Kaipo is out, but plays fine once Kaipo’s back in? It isn’t the line, it isn’t the perimeter blocking, it isn’t the fullback, and it isn’t whatever other reason you can come up with. The problem is the quarterback, no matter how much we don’t want to single anyone out. Navy could get away with running a scaled-down offense against Air Force, but that won’t cut it against Pitt.

Dave Wannstedt has talked a bit about being more aggressive in defending against Navy’s offense. He has also talked about how the Mids’ passing game really threw him off last year. Christian Swezey wrote a really good piece before last year’s game, talking about Wannstedt’s history of defending the wishbone:

In terms of a game plan, the Panthers’ coaches have a history of two schemes against the option.

In victories over Oklahoma in 1986 and 1987, Wannstedt relied on a speedy nose guard to disrupt the fullback up the middle.

The middle linebackers flowed to the side opposite the nose guard. And the outside defenders used their speed to focus only on the run.

The Sooners were held to 186 and 179 yards rushing in those two games; the passing game was open, but the Sooners completed only 10 of 25 passes.

You know that scene in Patton? “Rommel… You magnificent bastard, I read your BOOK!” That’s gotta be what it’s like when this coaching staff does game planning. Pitt came out doing exactly what Swezey described. On Navy’s first play of the game, Kaipo faked a toss sweep. The secondary committed to the fake and ignored the wide reciever, O.J. Washington, who made his way to the abandoned side of the field and was wiiiiiiiide open.

Hitting this play right off the bat scrambled Pitt’s entire game plan. Navy’s offense is not the wishbone, and coaches who defend it like they’d defend the wishbone get burnt. Wannstedt was unprepared for Navy’s passing ability because none of those old wishbone teams could throw consistently. Pitt’s secondary barely played run support after that pass. Wannstedt does have a new defensive coordinator, so it’s hard to guess how they’ll line up this time around. Paul Rhoads was picked up by Tommy Tuberville at Auburn, and in his place stepped former SMU head coach Phil Bennett. Bennett’s SMU team is the only win Navy had in Paul Johnson’s first year as head coach in Annapolis among schools whose names don’t rhyme with “Vest Joint.” I don’t know how the Mustangs lined up then, but at least we already know it didn’t work.

Of course, none of this matters if the quarterback can’t direct the offense. It sucks that there’s this much pressure on one guy, but it pretty much comes with the territory. Navy’s defense is improved to the point where McCoy won’t have quite as ridiculous a game as he had against the Mids last year, but he will still get his yards, and he’ll still score points. Navy’s offense will have to keep pace. Without Kaipo, I don’t know that they will. Here’s hoping for a breakthrough.

MONDAY POLL: BYE WEEKS

Congratulations to Matt Harmon. It’s going to be hard for him to fight through the swarm of adoring fans in downtown Annapolis now that he’s been tabbed as The Birddog’s People’s Choice MVP of the Air Force game. That’s the price of being a stone cold killah. This week, I pretty much have nothing. So I will ask you how you spent your last week. You had no Navy football to sustain you. How did you cope?

How did your spend your weekend of freedom? Some possibilities:

  • Went to a high school game.
  • Mowed grass that hasn’t been touched since August.
  • Feigned interest in other games.
  • Fought withdrawl symptoms.
  • Spent some “quality time” with the family. Hopefully it’s enough to tide over the ol’ ball & chain until the next bye week.

I left off “all of the above” because that’d be the obvious answer.

If you have a slightly more fulfilling life than mine, feel free to chime in here with your bye week exploits.

THE MIDLINE OPTION

After a 5-game stretch that included games against two teams currently ranked in the top 25, three BCS teams, and a service academy rival (with 4 of those 5 games being on the road ), to be sitting at 4-2 right now is a pretty great feeling. That feeling is made even greater when you consider how banged up the Mids are. With more concussions and hamstring problems than we know what to do with, plus the emotional cyclone of a string of intense games, the bye week probably couldn’t come at a better time. That’s good for the team, but bad for bloggers. Bye weeks are pretty quiet, and even next week’s opponent, Pitt, is off on Saturday. Finding something to write about can be a challenge. “OMG LOOK AT THE AWESOME HEALING” probably wouldn’t be a very entertaining bye week blog post. So to fill the void, I thought I’d do the same thing I did before last year’s Pitt game and take a look at a particular element of the Navy offense. This time around, we’ll look at the midline option, with a couple of examples.

A couple of you have sent me notes asking how I can tell when a play is an option play or when it’s designed for a specific runner to carry the ball. Since most examples of the latter in Ivin Jasper’s playbook still show a triple option motion in the backfield, it can be a little confusing. But you don’t need to be in the huddle to know; you just need to look away from the ball. You can tell by watching the offensive line. On an option play, you always leave certain players unblocked for the quarterback to read. When you see linemen running past their counterparts in the trenches in order to lay a block on a linebacker, you know it’s an option play. On the other hand, if you see the offensive linemen pushing straight ahead and simply blocking whoever is lined up in front of them, then you know that the player carrying the ball is doing so by design. (In fact, in games where film on an opponent’s defense might be scarce, it’s common for Paul Johnson or Ivin Jasper to call a designed handoff to the fullback on the first play while showing option motion in the backfield. They use that play to see how the linebackers and secondary will be playing the option. Once the coaches see that, they have a better idea of how they will want to call their game.) On “regular” triple option plays, it’s the playside offensive tackle leaving a 4, 4i, or 5 technique (usually a defensive end) unblocked to make a play for the quarterback to read.

OK, so what’s the “midline” option, then? All the midline option means is that the quarterback reads an interior lineman instead– the first down lineman from the guard out, usually a defensive tackle. Let’s take a look at one of my favorite midline option plays of the last few years, from the Emerald Bowl after the 2004 season:

This is the most common midline option that we see Navy run. It’s a QB-FB option, with the tail motion slotback becoming a blocker after the snap. You can see the defensive tackle being unblocked by the guard and going for the fullback. The guard makes sure he releases inside the read key, then proceeds to block the closest linebacker to the play. Or in this case, he gets blown up by the linebacker. (It may be a fine in kangaroo court, but it’s still enough to get the job done.) The playside tackle blocks the first defender outside the quarterback’s read; here it’s the outside linebacker in New Mexico’s 3-3-5 scheme. The two slotbacks become lead blockers for the quarterback and take on the defensive backs coming up to play run support; you won’t find many examples of slotback blocking quite as good as this.

So how does the midline compliment the rest of the playbook? The spread formation stretches the defense from sideline to sideline, and having four potential downfield receiving threats stretches the defense vertically. The central theme of any spread offense is to force the other team to defend the whole field. The triple option is such a great play in part because it attacks three different areas at once, putting pressure on the defense. But what it doesn’t attack is the middle of the field, right up the gut. That’s where the midline fits in. Defenses that are a little too aggressive in flowing outside to stop the triple can find themselves a little soft up the middle. By optioning off of, say, a 3 tech instead of a 4 or 5 tech, you force the defense to cover different gaps.

The midline brings some other things to the table too. One of the advantages that you get from running the option is the somewhat counterintuitive ability to neutralize a defense’s best player by not blocking him. If you execute properly, the play goes wherever the read doesn’t. It’s kind of like sending the defender on a wild goose chase; no matter who he chooses to cover, he’ll never make a play on the ball carrier if the QB makes the right read. By adding the midline option on top of existing triple option plays, the offensive coordinator has the ability to option off of any down lineman.

Against Rutgers, the midline option was the offense’s most effective play. But in that game, we saw a different wrinkle– the midline triple option. Instead of the tail motion slotback becoming a blocker, he becomes the pitch man. In the “heavy” formation, the wide receiver filled in for the extra tackle that was moved to one side of the formation. The defensive line shifted to match the new alignment, lining the DE up across from the guard in a 3 technique. The midline would option off of him. The DB “covering” the wide receiver became the first player lined up outside the read, making him the WR-turned-tackle’s responsibility. Even though personnel are shifted around, the play is run the same way you’d run any other midline option:

One thing about the midline is that it’s a very fast read for the quarterback. The good news, though, is that the defender has to commit just as quickly. The sooner a defender commits on an option play, the easier it usually is to read. On this play, the read turned his shoulders to the fullback, so Kaipo kept the ball.

Ivin Jasper called the exact same thing on the next play. The read didn’t want to get fooled again, so he stepped upfield and played the quarterback:

(If you want to see the midline triple where Kaipo pitches to the slotback, go back to the clips in the Rutgers recap post. Just ignore the arrows this time.)

Craig Candeto used to call the QB-FB midline his favorite play because he only had one read, and the DT tends to take the fullback most of the time. In fact, you’ll frequently hear this play mistakenly called a designed QB keeper by TV analysts, since the quarterback usually does end up keeping the ball. Sometimes you do see designed keepers, especially in short yardage situations. But more often than not, it’s the midline option. Hopefully now you know how to tell the difference!

OPEN THREAD TUESDAY

It’s a bye week. You have things on your mind. Feel free to let it all out here. We won’t judge *snicker*. Go ahead and talk about whatever you want.

By the way, if you’re worried about black helicopters and whatnot, you don’t need to fill out a name or e-mail address or anything. I don’t know why WordPress asks for that stuff.

MONDAY POLL: MVP

Last week I asked for Navy’s biggest win since 2003. 174 of you voted, and the predictably resounding winner was the 2007 Notre Dame game, with 123 votes. I tried to make my case for 2003 Air Force, but I failed to sway the steely-eyed and uncompromising jury of Birddog readers.

This week, we give out the People’s Choice award for MVP of the Air Force game. Do you vote for a playmaker or a workhorse? The candidates:

  • Jarod Bryant: 24 carries, 101 yards, and a touchdown.
  • Eric Kettani: 75 of the toughest yards you’ll ever see.
  • Greg Shinego: Blocked punt #1, setting the tone for the game.
  • Blake Carter: Returned the first blocked punt for a TD and blocked a punt of his own. He sat at my table at the bowl luncheon in Charlotte. Naturally, I take credit for his performance.
  • Matt Harmon: As far as we know, there’s no rule against laser-guided footballs.
  • Nate Frazier: General beastliness.

Make your case!

NAVY 33, AIR FORCE 27

How you feel about Saturday’s 33-27 victory at Air Force probably depends on your frame of reference.

In the context of the 2008 season, it was not a very good game for the Mids. It was a win, so it wasn’t a disaster; but that doesn’t mean that everyone played well. The Navy defense, so stout a week ago at Wake Forest, took a step backwards. Air Force was able to pile up 411 yards of offense, the most they’ve had against I-A competition this year. Navy was never able to contain the pitch man on the option, and the Falcons made more big plays in the passing game than they had in their other four games combined. It didn’t get any better on the offensive side of the ball. Navy’s 244 yards of total offense was the team’s lowest output since the 2006 Rutgers game, when Brian Hampton’s shin was involuntarily separated from his thigh. As expected, the offense sputtered under Jarod Bryant. Shun White was a non-factor in the running game other than his fumble, Tyree Barnes didn’t have a catch, and the Mids were outrushed 227-206. You could say that Navy was lucky to win this game.

Those of us who have been Navy fans all our lives might see things a little bit differently. There was a time when the idea of beating Air Force with half our offense tied behind our back was completely unfathomable. Air Force used to be so talented relative to Navy that only a flawless effort in every phase of the game would give the Mids a chance. Now, the tables have turned. Not only did Navy win with a watered-down offense, but they scored 33 points! For me, Navy’s victory on Saturday was nothing short of brilliant.

Before the game I said that as long as Jarod Bryant took care of the ball, Navy’s playmakers should carry the day. Early on, taking care of the ball appeared to be a lot easier said than done, as both Jarod and Shun White coughed up fumbles that were recovered by Air Force. But for the most part, the offense settled down and the plays started to come. Bryant himself turned in a 29-yard run to set up a field goal. Shun White pulled in a pass for 38 yards that set up another field goal. Matt Harmon kicked the field goals to finish those drives, plus two more. Greg Shinego and Blake Carter each blocked punts. Nate Frazier was an absolute nightmare. Nate completely owned the center all afternoon; there were at least three plays where he was in the backfield so fast that he nearly tackled the quarterback before he could hand the ball off. You don’t think those fumbled snaps were a fluke, do you? Nate was in the center’s head. That wasn’t an accident. The bottom line is that when all was said and done, Navy made more plays because they had the players that could.

I know that probably isn’t enough for some of you, especially when the offense looked so ineffective. Why didn’t Ivin Jasper open up the playbook a little more? Well, because he didn’t have to. Navy was the better team. The only way that Air Force would win this game is if the Mids turned the ball over. So why take the chance at opening up the playbook with a quarterback that we all know isn’t as comfortable with running the offense? Air Force never led by more than 3 points, and never led after halftime. Navy had a two-score lead in the 4th quarter. So why tempt fate? What would be the point? If it appeared that things might get out of hand, you probably would have seen things open up a bit more. But Coach Jasper never had to.

Calling plays in this offense, like most offenses, isn’t just a matter of picking out a bunch of awesome plays and sending them in. There’s a natural progression, where each play sets up other plays later in the series. The problem is that for the Navy offense, the play that almost everything else is based off of is the triple option. Without that, it’s hard to open up the playbook effectively. Sure, there were still things that could be done to mix things up a bit more, but Jarod fumbled three times even playing conservatively. He isn’t a particularly good passer, and he was having trouble pitching the ball. That’s the sort of stuff you’d have to do to open up the offense, and the more you put those things to the test, the more you flirt with disaster.

It wasn’t the prettiest game, but “pretty” is overrated. The bottom line is that despite last year’s expert analysis from their athletic director, Team Jesus Christ lost to Navy for the sixth straight year. Nobody has won the Commander-in-Chief’s Trophy yet, but at least we know where it isn’t going.

Some other thoughts:

— Air Force backup quarterback Tim Jefferson led the Falcons’ last scoring drive. He looked impressive… The same way Jarod Bryant looked impressive in the 4th quarter against Duke last year. It’s amazing what fresh legs can do against a tired defense. Those of you inclined to worry about everything Air Force may want to hold off on the whole “Oh noes he’s going to be awesome!!!” talk for a little while. I don’t want to be hearing about his impending Heisman Trophy the way I had to hear about Shaun Carney for four years.

— Hats off to the coaching staff for going after Air Force’s first punt. When you know that your offense isn’t going to have a good day, trying to make a play on special teams is a smart move. As for the second punt, that looked like more of an individual effort on Blake Carter’s part.

— Speaking of the second punt block… I’m not usually a fan of going for two points unless it’s truly necessary, but after Bobby Doyle recovered the ball in the end zone for a touchdown in the 4th quarter, Niumat really should have gone for the two-point conversion. With only ten minutes left in the game, a 13-point lead is no better than a 12-point lead; either way, the other team needs two touchdowns to win. But with a 14-point lead, two touchdowns most likely sends you to overtime. Maybe Niumat thought 10 minutes was enough time for Air Force to score a TD and two field goals?

— The stat sheet won’t reflect it, but Eric Kettani played a monster game. Almost every one of his 75 yards came after first contact. Take next Saturday off, Eric. You’ve earned it.

— Matt Harmon was 4 for 4 on field goals, including a 48-yarder as time expired in the first half and a 44-yarder into the wind. He is second in the country with 2.33 FGs per game, and his 93.3% accuracy leads all kickers with at least 10 attempts. He should get serious consideration for All-America honors.

GAME WEEK: AIR FORCE

In the poll question for the week, I asked what you thought was Navy’s biggest win since 2003. It was a stupid way to phrase the question, since the tear-jerking, now-I-can-die-in-peace awesomeness that was the ’07 Notre Dame game was sure to be the clear winner. I mean, really… How many other games over the last five years left you sobbing with joy? (Don’t act like you didn’t). That said, even if I rephrased the question to “what was the most important Navy win since 2003,” most of you would probably still say Notre Dame. I disagree; I think there’s an important distinction between “big” and important.” In my opinion, the most important win for the Navy program since Paul Johnson was hired was the 28-25 win over #25 Air Force in 2003.

I’m sure that seems like a stretch to some of you. After all, it’s a year later and you probably still feel a bit of disbelief over Navy finally being free from the yoke of that abominable losing streak. I sure do. But try to take emotion out of the equation for a minute. The pool of potential recruits for service academies is very small. As a result, all three schools compete with each other for the same kids. Being top dog amongst the three is a huge advantage. Now think back to 2003. Air Force was ranked 25th in the coaches’ poll coming into that game after a 24-10 win over BYU the previous week had moved them to 5-0. The Falcons hadn’t had a losing record in 10 years, and hadn’t lost to Navy since Paul Johnson’s first stint in Annapolis. They were clearly the dominant service academy football program, and for the most part won any head-to-head recruiting battle they had with Navy and Army. Shaun Carney might have been the only recruit classless enough to actually tell his Naval Academy hosts that they’d never beat Air Force, but there’s no way that he was the only one who was thinking that way. Why wouldn’t they? The track record spoke for itself. Fisher DeBerry was a legend, and when he “sent a message” by trying to run up the score in Air Force’s 48-7 win over Navy a year earlier, he was sending it to recruits as much as he was to Paul Johnson and the Navy team. The message? That nothing had changed. Air Force was still Air Force, and Navy was still Navy. Recruits had to rely on faith when Navy coaches told them better times were ahead. Air Force coaches had something a little more tangible– the Commander in Chief’s Trophy.

The statement play of a statement game.
The statement play of a statement game.

All that changed in 2003. Craig Candeto punched in a 2-yard touchdown run in the second quarter, and Navy never trailed for the rest of the game. The 28-25 Navy win was a watershed moment for both programs. From that point on, recruits didn’t have to take Paul Johnson’s word for it; they knew he could beat Air Force. Navy would go on to win six of its last eight games that season and earn a berth in the Houston Bowl, the first of five straight bowl games for the Mids. Air Force would move in the opposite direction, losing four of its next six to finish 7-5 and out of the bowl picture after that 5-0 start. It would be Fisher DeBerry’s last winning season at Air Force, as the veteran coach retired in 2006 after limping to a 4-8 record. For those four years from 2003-2006, Navy enjoyed the “seeing is believing” recruiting boost that Air Force once owned, resulting in the talented roster that you see today.

In a strange way, history is repeating itself. Given that Navy has won five straight games in the series, it’s a bit odd that it’s Ken Niumatalolo who seemingly has something to prove. Troy Calhoun lost to Navy in his first shot against the Mids, but he did lead Air Force to a 9-4 record in 2007. It was enough for various media members to proclaim the resurgence of Air Force football and hail Troy Calhoun as the real deal. Niumatalolo, however, hasn’t received the benefit of the doubt. The media consensus is that Navy just isn’t as good without Paul Johnson, even though most of those making that claim either A) almost certainly haven’t even seen Navy this year, or B) never gave Navy any credit even with Paul Johnson. Air Force was just held to 53 yards rushing against Utah while Navy is coming off of back-to-back wins over BCS opponents, including what was the highest-ranked team in the ACC; but Navy still opened the week as a 6-point underdog. For some reason, the media seems eager to hand the service academy crown back to Air Force, which makes this game as crucial to the Navy program as the 2003 game was. Recruits read the newspaper, too. Winning this game would make Coach Niumat’s job a lot easier by helping to maintain momentum on the recruiting trail.

That makes it a particularly bad time for him to lose his starting quarterback. While not an absolute certainty, Kaipo’s hamstring is probably going to keep him on the sideline once again, and Jarod Bryant will get the call to start his third game of the season. It’s been a rough season for Jarod so far. In the second quarter at Wake Forest, Jarod relieved Kaipo for the second time in three weeks. And just like in the Duke game, the offense screeched to a halt… at first. Unlike in the loss to the Blue Devils, the offense recovered a bit in the fourth quarter. First there was a toss sweep to Bobby Doyle that went for 39 yards and finally moved Navy away from their own endzone. The next drive produced a 57-yard run by Eric Kettani that set up the game-clinching touchdown. Neither were option plays, but the Doyle run was a result of an audible called by Bryant at the line of scrimmage. The Mids were lined up in the same unbalanced line that we saw against Rutgers. Jarod saw a numbers advantage on the short side of the field and changed the direction of the play. It was a good check by the highly-scrutinized signal-caller, and something that Coach Niumatalolo says should give him some confidence heading into this week.

Maybe it will. But what difference does “confidence” really make? The knock on Jarod was never his ability to read a defense at the line of scrimmage. It was his option reads after the snap. Confidence in what you’re doing is important, but does it help a quarterback identify and react to a mesh charge or a squat any better? It’s debatable. On one hand, you certainly don’t want to hesitate or second-guess what you’re doing. There’s no time to think; everything has to be a quick reaction to what you see. On the other hand, it’s just as easy to be confidently wrong. A fast reaction that gets yourself drilled in the backfield doesn’t do any good either. That seems to be what happens to Jarod. The most frustrating thing about all this is that we’ve seen Jarod make the right reads before. When Kaipo injured his knee in last year’s Ball State game, Jarod played the entire second half. At first, Paul Johnson called a lot of plays that were predetermined carries, especially the toss sweep. But as the half progressed, Coach Johnson starting mixing more of the triple option in. And Jarod did fine. Hell, by leading Navy on a comeback and putting the team in position to win the game at the end, you could even say it was better than just “fine.” So what happened? Why was Jarod able to run the triple against Ball State last year, but not since? Part of it is that Ball State didn’t exactly do anything to make things hard for Jarod; they gave him the same read almost every time. But perhaps another part of the problem comes from confidence that was lost somewhere along the way. Or maybe I’m just reaching. As I type this, I keep telling myself that talking so much about something as generic as “confidence” sounds trite. Then again, a little confidence has worked wonders for the defense the last couple of weeks. Do I let myself feel as optimistic about the offense?

Maybe. With Jarod Bryant at quarterback, the triple option hasn’t been available. That’s the one play that everything else in the offense feeds off of. The coaches say that they call plays differently because Jarod’s a better inside runner, but that’s because they don’t want to throw the poor guy under the bus. Think about it– they didn’t move him to slotback because of his ability to run between the tackles. I’m sure the coaches would love to see Jarod get to the edge, but he just hasn’t been able to read his way there. So the question is how effective Jarod will be, and whether the coaches will be forced to put him back into a protective playcalling bubble. If he can put it together, he will have a lot going for him. First and foremost is the re-emergence of Eric Kettani the last two weeks. Wake Forest paid a lot of attention to Shun White; so much so that Eric had some gaping holes to run through. With 300 yards in his last two games, Eric has shown that he is healthy enough that defenses need to respect the middle of the field. That helps to open things back up for Shun. Bobby Doyle’s big run last week is good news, too. Coach Jasper should be a bit more confident that his other slots should be able to make a play. At the very least, it’s one more thing to make a defense hesitate from keying too much on Shun.

Something else to to watch during the game is the matchup of the Navy offensive line with the front seven of Air Force. When Ken Niumatalolo was asked before the season why he moved Ricky Moore to center, the first thing out of his mouth was, “Air Force.” Air Force runs a base 3-4 defense. Against Navy, they like to move the two outside linebackers to the line of scrimmage to present a 5-man front. The odd front means that the nose guard is usually lined up directly on top of the center. Ricky Moore is bigger than other recent Navy centers, and the idea is that a bigger center will help open up more room for the fullback by moving that nose guard. If it works, that’s even better news for Kettani.

For Air Force, it’s the second straight year where they’ve started out 3-1 when logic would have convinced you before the season that they’d be a lot worse. But just like the beginning of last year, their defense is carrying the team, and they do it by being extremely aggressive. Through four games, the Air Force defense has compiled 16 sacks while forcing 12 turnovers. Jake Paulson leads the charge with seven of those sacks, while linebacker Ken Lamendola averages nine tackles per game. But the dirty little secret about the Air Force team is that this year, their defense is so aggressive because they have to be. If they didn’t force so many turnovers, Air Force might never score. It’s true that Air Force is sixth in the nation in rushing with nearly 282 yards per game. But that includes the 433 yards racked up against the notorious Southern Utah juggernaut. Since then, they’ve only averaged 231 yards per game. Sure, you could say the same thing about Navy and Towson, but trust me– this is different. Even with the backup quarterback taking the majority of their snaps, Navy is 33rd in the country in total offense. Air Force is 85th. So far, the Air Force offense has twice been held to only 12 first downs and less than 300 total yards. Against Utah, they had only 53 yards rushing. 53! Quarterback Shea Smith averages one interception in every ten passes, and was 0-for-7 passing against Houston– a game where Air Force was outgained by 154 yards. Air Force likes to feature a runner in each game; there was at least one 100-yard runner in each of their nine wins last year. But in 2008, they don’t have anyone they can rely on. Before the season there was a lot of hoopla about cornerback Reggie Rembert playing both ways this year. Air Force fans will tell you that it’s because he’s just that damn good, but the reality is that such things wouldn’t even be considered if there was enough speed and talent on the offensive side of the ball to begin with. The Falcons could get a boost this week with the return of Ty Paffett, who was out after offseason back surgery. Paffett plays the hybrid WR/RB “Z-receiver” that Chad Hall played last year, but it’s unclear just how effective he can be in his first game back.

If Kaipo was healthy, this game wouldn’t even be close, especially now that Navy’s defense has been reborn. Navy should still win, but it’s a much different game with Jarod Bryant at the helm. The Air Force defense is going to come after him hard. The game will be won or lost on Jarod’s ability to handle it. Hopefully, Jarod understands that he shouldn’t feel any pressure to make a big play. There is nothing wrong with punting and letting your defense win a field-position battle. If he can do that– and hold onto the ball– then Navy should get enough big plays from their more talented skill-position players to come out on top.

KAIPO WATCH ’08: DAY FOUR

Coach Niumatalolo said at his press briefing yesterday that Kaipo still isn’t ready to run, and would be at best a gametime decision. He said that Jarod Bryant would be most likely to get the start no matter what, with Kaipo hopefully being good enough to play in a pinch.